This Paper is intended to answer a specific objection advanced by the Anti-Federalists:  that the 1787 Constitution did not provide adequate safeguards against the existence of a standing army in peacetime (an outdated objection in our day and age).  Hamilton’s counter-argument, in a nutshell, is that we don’t have to worry about the President using the army to undermine the remainder of the government and to usurp kingly power, because it is the legislative branch who keeps the military’s purse strings.

What I found most interesting about F24 was Publius’s sizeable digression into what he saw as the Anti-Federalists’ dishonesty in advancing this objection to the Constitution.  In some of the strongest language we’ve seen yet, he wrote that the Anti-Feds’ argument regarding the standing army “was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous.”  Later, he rants that the Anti-Federalist position results from “the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country!” (exclamation point original!)

222 years later, these bitter criticisms seem equally applicable to much of the public discourse.  Sarah Palin has been offering rhetoric about “death panels” in connection with the current health care debate – and her stance is being condemned even by her fellow Republicans.  Are her remarks the result of “a deliberate intention to deceive” or “the overflowing of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous”?  And the nonsensical flap over President Obama’s citizenship and religious persuasion – seems like a great example of  “an experiment upon the public credulity.”

Certainly both the 2009 rhetoric and the 1787 rhetoric appear to be directed at manipulating the public’s fears (although it is not always obvious to what end – accumulating more power, I guess?).  The Anti-Feds in 1787 were, according to Hamilton, trying to get the public to freak out by insinuating that the President would have sole command of a standing army on American soil, which he would likely use to oppress the people and bend them to his will.  Similarly, Palin has been trying to get folks to believe the Democrats’ health plan would force doctors to engage in triage and ultimately refuse to give health care to the very weakest, most helpless members of our society (everybody has two grandmas, after all, and no one wants the government to pull the plug on them!).  Likewise, those who constantly repeat their refrains about the President’s citizenship and alleged Muslim ties are trying to take advantage of the fears created by 9/11 and people’s general fear of other people unlike themselves.

A few days after posting on Hamilton’s vision of an energetic government in F23, I listened to an archived debate from the Constitution Center in Philly. John C. Bogle and Peter J. Wallison offered opposing views on financial industry regulation; and in the mix, Bogle quoted a David Brook’s column from the Times that, in turn, evoked our energetic government. So I’ll do the same; perhaps these segments from Brooks’ column can help us get at what Hamilton envisions in F23:

There are two major political parties in America, but there are at least three major political tendencies. The first is orthodox liberalism, a belief in using government to maximize equality. The second is free-market conservatism, the belief in limiting government to maximize freedom.

But there is a third tendency, which floats between. It is for using limited but energetic government to enhance social mobility. This tendency began with Alexander Hamilton, who created a vibrant national economy so more people could rise and succeed. It matured with Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War Republicans, who created the Land Grant College Act and the Homestead Act to give people the tools to pursue their ambitions. It continued with Theodore Roosevelt, who busted the trusts to give more Americans a square deal.

Members of this tradition are Americanized Burkeans, or to put it another way, progressive conservatives.

The Hamiltonian-Bull Moose tendency is the great, moderate strain in American politics. In some sense this whole campaign was a contest to see which party could reach out from its base and occupy that centrist ground. The Democratic Party did that. Senitor Democrats like Robert Rubin, Larry Summers and Jason Furman actually created something called The Hamilton Project to lay out a Hamiltonian approach for our day.

F23 is about the minimum power that government needs in order to do those things that it appropriately ought to do: the “necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.”

So Brooks ties together energy and limitation in his third (and, to his sadness, unheard) political tendency.

I don’t get that pairing out of Hamilton’s F23; indeed the essay seemed quite removed from a call to limits. To be fair, though, I doubt Brooks is basing his Hamiltonian-Bull Moose 3rd stream on F23. So we shall have see whether Brooks rightly describes Hamilton’s understanding of an energetic government as we go through future Federalists.

I wonder if Hamilton’s governmental energy is more synonymous with action or vigor. Action, as in activity, doing things, taking on responsibilities. Or vigor, as in a quick jolt, an ability to act quickly, effectiveness. I can imagine the former weeding out, and swallowing up jurisdictions; while I can imagine the latter possibly pairing with limits.

Lest, by the 23rd installment of pro-Constitution newsprint, the reader grow dull-eyed, Hamilton awakes any sleepers with a new title urging an energetic government. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union.

I like that adjective. Civics classes echo with “powerful” and “centralized,” but I don’t remember hearing “energetic” to describe federal government, in a good light nor dimly. Indeed, the government staff employee union’s PR rep would do well to pick up the moniker in defense against the paradigm of bureaucratic do-nothing laziness.

In any event, Hamilton focuses the essays, with F23, on government power, and proposes three clear questions for deliberation on the subject: (1) what ought the federal government provide (2) how much power is needed to provide it, and (3) upon whom ought that power operate?

Federal government, writes Hamilton, provides for defense, peace (ie, stability against internal riots and revolts, and against external attacks), interstate and foreign commercial regulation, and foreign relations.

Hamilton frames the question of power as he does because he wants the answer to #2 to flow from #1. Rightly, it seems to me, he stresses throughout the essay that the allowed extent of power ought relate to the goal for which power is granted. So, I initially thought Hamilton would urge a spectrum of power relative to the nature of the particular goal.

For the goal of common defense, the federal government needs power to raise armies, build fleets, and govern and provide for both. To do this, the federal government needs, writes Hamilton, limitless power. Also, the government needs that power to operate over individuals, rather than state and local governments; … “we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions as equally impracticable and unjust.”

So, in my notes I drew a two-sided arrow that I figured would represent the sliding scale of power-quantity, with “limitless” at one pole.

But, all of Hamilton’s goals of federal government turned out to require limitless power. “The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend.

So much for my power diagram.

We left off a few months ago* with F18, F19, & F20’s romp through world history, which served to explain how weak federations of small sovereigns always tend fail as effective governments. The next two Papers are Publius’s gripe list about the United States as constituted under the Articles of Confederation (AoC). As my colleague Andrew discussed assiduously in our last Federalist post, F21 contains three complaints: (1) the AoC provides no way for the federal government to enforce its laws against the states; (2) in the case of either homegrown insurrection or foreign invasion, the AoC does not oblige, or indeed permit, other states to come to the assistance of the beleaguered state; and (3) there is simply no efficient or fair way to split up the costs of governing among the existing states, so the AoC necessarily fails at it.

F22 lists the following additional gripes: (4) the USA under the AoC lacks the power to regulate commerce, so no foreign countries want to enter into trade agreements with us; (5) the power to raise a federal army exists in theory but is way too weak; (6) the states have equal suffrage even though they are very different in size, wealth, and power; (7) there is no federal judicial power, leaving the country subject to the vagaries of 13 state supreme courts; and (8) the AoC was approved by the states, but never by the people directly. It is on this final point that F22 waxes most eloquent:

“[There is a] necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”

Here we have the strongest statement yet of a major (maybe even the major) Federalist theme: that sovereignty should flow directly from the people — not from the people to the states, and only then on to the federal government. This was the whole point of F18-F20, which discussed examples from both ancient and modern history in which attempts to form a coalition of governments failed miserably. (Incidentally, I think it is really funny that, in four of the last five Federalist Papers we’ve discussed on here, Publius uses the word “imbecility” to describe governments of governments.)

Wonder what Publius would think about the United Nations? Or the World Trade Organization? NATO? The EU? The list goes on . . . . Certainly these bodies suffer from many, many, many of the defects Publius deplores. But arguably, they are not all TOTAL disasters. Has the world changed so much since Publius’s time, that his concerns no longer encompass the whole story . . . or has he just been wrong all along?

* One cross-country move, one job change, and one bar exam later, Lily is finally jumping back into blogging The Federalist! Thanks to APO for keeping the flame alive!

James Madison offered a walking tour of ancient greek government associations in F18, and fast forwards to his contemporary germanic empire in F19.  I see, here, the clear evidence for a historiographical 400 level college course titled “The Federalist Papers and the Role of History in Late 18th Century America.”  

One immediate takeaway is Madison’s letting history speak for itself.  A good essay question for that college course would ask whether this is strictly Madisonian, or was his audience inclined to make the connection between history (and current events abroad) and the present controversy in America: the Constitution’s proposed structure of government.

That said, I suppose Madison isn’t really letting history speak for itself.  It is true that he makes no direct “this-thus-this” analogy with the early American situation; but, his telling of history (his interpretation of history) betrays his point.  For instance, speaking of the germanic empire:

The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

 

One can see in Madison’s telling of history and his interpretation of current events the roots of current Originalist jurisprudence.  And in both, the two (in my mind) dominant themes exist: (1) the earnest attempt to use historical and existing events to add knowledge to one’s present decision; and (2) the fallacy that one can evoke and discuss those events without fundamentally interpreting them.

Some of those conflicts among the young states, which are foretold by F7, continue to hang around now that the states are no longer quite so young (though still pretty restless!)

Boundary disputes? Still around. Georgia v. Tennessee: in this time of drought, who owns the river?

Commercial competition between states? Look at the lengths to which North Carolina is willing to go, in order to lure companies to set up shop here instead of somewhere else: NC gave Dell Computers $300 million in tax breaks to get the company to agree to build a plant in Winston-Salem. NC is even getting sued over it. You bet the states are still competing with each other for economic advantage.

States and local governments in debt? Of course! New Jersey is struggling under a mountain of debt created by increased pensions for public employees, and Vallejo has just achieved the dubious distinction of becoming the largest city in California to declare bankruptcy.

Future Chief Justice Jay, you had to leave us with this?

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.

F5 is the last (except one more, much later) of Jay’s posts to the Federalist team nlog (newspaper log?). Jay’s posts seem to have been in the theme of what we’d now call the politics of fear…you want a union, not several factious confederacies, answering that red phone.

Having dealt with just, and unjust, against America from abroad, Jay notes in F5 that non-united states or confederacies would suffer with in-fighting.

I noticed in this post the frequency with which Jay discusses confederations as the alternative to union. Apparently, during the decision to adopt or not the Constitution, groups of states joining together was more (?) of an alternative than the states remaining autonomous. It is a spooky thing to read thinking, some 70 years down the road, of the looming Confederacy.

With a handful of confederacies bunched up against each other, Jay argues, some will prospers, others will be jealous, and they’ll tend to maintain different alliances with foreign nations. This last makes particular sense, given that fondness for France or England seems to’ve played as much a part as anything else in forming the first political parties.

Apparently Jay thought the northern confederacy would naturally be stronger than the southern. What he means by gathering honey I can only imagine.

Jay’s Federalist #4 is a follow-up to #3′s discussion of why a union of the States is safest for the people. F3 was about how a united America would give other nations less occasion to be angry with us — thus provoking fewer “just causes” for war. F4 supplements this argument by describing how the union would also give other countries fewer “unjust causes” for war — hence, fewer wars based on “jealousies and uneasinesses.” The main point is that a united group of states provides a stronger deterrence to unjust foreign invasion than thirteen nations, or even three or four “confederacies” of colonies. Jay argues that union is essential for military reasons, because that way any foreign attack on one colony’s soil becomes an attack on all 13 colonies. Further, he contends that a well-managed federal government with prosperous trade, established credit, organized militia, and “free, contented, and united” people, will cause foreign nations to be “much more disposed to cultivate our friendship, than provoke our resentment.”

To our modern eyes, F4 contains a haunting matter-of-factness about the risks of an invasion of America by foreign nations — an event that has been well-nigh inconceivable for the vast majority of American history.* Even the two most infamous encroachments of American soil, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, were essentially attacks — not invasions, by any stretch. This historical record of impregnability bears out the worthiness of Jay’s arguments. He’s right — America’s strength has ensured no nation, not even our worst enemies, seriously contemplates invading us. Almost no one has ever dared, not even the USSR during the Cold War. But as F4′s pragmatic discussion made me realize, that kind of security was not always something we could take for granted. F4 was addressed to an audience of people who had had to fight, in hand-to-hand combat, to defend their own hometowns and families.

A couple of additional points about F4 that intrigue me:

1) In the first three Federalist papers, there are lots of references to the “people,” but none to “the People.” But right here in paragraph two of F4, Jay discusses “the safety of the People of America” . He follows up on that zinger with about a million references to “we” and “us” and “our” — almost like he is working to create a sense of American unity subliminally within his prose. By the time you’re finished reading, you can’t help but feel like an American, instead of a New Yorker. Kinda cool.

2) In further demonstration of Jay’s willingness to appeal to his audience’s emotions as well as their intellect, F4′s closing paragraph is a description of how all the other nations will scorn America as “a poor, pitiful figure” if it splinters into 13 colonies or 3-4 “confederacies.” He’s not above making people feel embarrassed to vote against union!

On a more general note, I applaud Andrew’s prescience in starting up this examination of The Federalist. These issues about union are SO alive and well today, and not just in America. Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq, testified to Congress last week that Iraq’s recent passage of a crucial law defining the relationship between the central government and the Iraqi provinces followed a debate “similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate over states’ rights.”

* When was the last time we were truly invaded? War of 1812? Did the Spanish technically invade us via Mexico a few times?

With his second ‘post,’ John Jay offers some specific arguments for the benefits of union when regards foreign policy. As an added bonus, he defines just causes for war:

1) broken treaties; or

2) direct violence.

Jay argues that a single government will better prevent war on both potential causes. And for both, the more convincing argument is that a national government would pick fewer fights than the several states or confederacies–legal or physical. More states = more treaties = more chances for breach. Also, inconsistency among the various treaties would lead to equally various interpretations and subsequent political action on the treaties (which I suppose to mean more chances for breach or, eek, managerial headaches).

Jay then argues that the states are more willing than the national government to pick fights. By way of example, he notes that not “a single Indian war has yet been produced by aggressions of the present federal government … but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.”

Jay figures that the national government will be less prideful than State governments, and being more coolheaded, will be the better to dissolve conflicts. This seems right, but I would be interested in a book that examines this claim in light of U.S. history and compared to other balkanized governments that Jay figures would have been picking hot-headed little wars.

It is worth highlighting one of Jay’s key assumptions: the national government will draw wiser leaders. “When once the national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it ….”

His reasoning is that the bigger pool of contestants for the national government will produce the very best results. State and local governments may have fine folk, but the national government will require “more extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications.” Jay figures that an mediocre mayor that might reign in provincial backwoods would not stand up to the scrutiny of national government. I wonder whether this notion holds up.

Jay assumes the similar types of scrutiny and selection go on in local and national politics–so that a bigger pool of contestants simply means better quality in the ultimate selection. But isn’t it so that a national candidate will be much more unknowable to most selectors than those local candidates that towns and states choose? Except for the few powers-that-be that prop up national-scope leaders, we are not really aware of these interstate candidates until well-nigh election time.

It is only slightly possible today–with internets, medias, and so forth–to earnestly track and reasonably compare would-be national leaders. How, exactly, did Jay envision voters doing this in 1788? Assuming he envisioned State legislators tracking would-be Senators, or, Congress tracking would-be Presidents – how would these folks really elevate the best folks to National attention? It seems to me Jay is ignoring the role of chance, etc, in such things.

Federalist # 2 is John Jay’s first appearance as “Publius.” He echoes several of Hamilton’s themes from Federalist # 1, not least Hamilton’s caution that “we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.” As a logical consequence, Jay adds, “[L]et it be remembered, that [the Constitution] is neither recommended to blind approbation, nor to blind reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration, which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive.” (Emphasis original.)

What an extraordinary way to argue! They are effectively saying, we don’t want you to agree with us unless you’ve really thought hard about it. Don’t just follow the herd in endorsing our desired outcome (i.e. the ratification of the Constitution), and be done with it. Instead, agree with us for the right reasons (i.e. the reasons we are going to lay out for you in these papers).

These days we are pretty familiar with exhortations to civic engagement, but if you think about the historical context of Hamilton and Jay, you begin to see how groundbreaking and imaginative this is. A mere generation before Publius, the mass of the governed were not expected to participate in their government. They might get to send representatives to Parliament, but that was theoretically only because the king allowed it. Sovereignty ultimately rested in the Crown, not in the people. But Federalist # 2 is setting the bar higher by saying: “Look, you are free to accept or reject this, but at least give it some thought.” I think that is one reason why so much space is given throughout the Federalist Papers to arguing that the decision about whether to ratify is IMPORTANT. People were not yet in the habit of having to think about these things very hard. (In fact, we still might not be in that habit . . . )

The last few lines of Federalist #2 contain more evidence of Jay’s imagination and his effective use of emotional as well as logical argument. “Farewell! A long farewell, to all my greatness!” is a quotation from Shakespeare’s Henry VIII. The speaker is Cardinal Wolsey, reflecting on his fall from power. (Read the Cardinal’s full speech here.) But as of October 31, 1787, the date of Federalist # 2, America was a long way from achieving greatness! It was a ten-year-old, motley collection of squabbling colonies. But Jay has the foresight to see the huge potential of the new united nation. His patriotism, indeed is reflected throughout the paper, from his descriptions of America’s beauty and vast natural resources (“This country and this people seem to have been made for each other”), to his repeated praise of the Philadelphia delegates, who he describes as “highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men.”

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